The Anti-Corruption Law and Environmental Integrity: The Clash Between the STJ, the STF, and Vale

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As a landmark case recently under review by the STJ and STF, the CGU fine imposed on Vale reaffirms the role of Law No. 12.846/2013 in protecting environmental integrity.

At the beginning of 2026, we are witnessing one of the most decisive debates for the future of corporate integrity and its regulation in Brazil: does the "Anti-Corruption" Law (Law 12.846/2013 – LAC) serve only to punish acts harmful to the Public Power, such as "bribery" in tenders and contracts, or does it also encompass frauds that violate socio-environmental integrity and deceive regulatory bodies during major violations of social and environmental rights?

The backdrop of this discussion is the R$ 86.2 million fine imposed by the Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) on Vale, resulting from the 2019 Brumadinho tragedy. The central accusation, investigated in an Administrative Accountability Proceeding (PAR), is that the company allegedly entered false and incomplete information into the Integrated Mining Dam Management System (SIGBM), directly obstructing or "prejudicing" the National Mining Agency’s (ANM) inspection of the dam in Minas Gerais.

What Does the "Anti-Corruption" Law (Law 12.846/2013) Address?

Before diving into the legal clash, it is worth briefly revisiting the regulation at the heart of the discussion. Also known as the "Clean Company Act," the LAC was enacted in 2013 amid strong social outcry and to meet international commitments undertaken by Brazil (such as OECD and UN conventions).

It should be noted that the popular identification of this law as the "Anti-Corruption Law" is not the most accurate. This is because the law contains no express or literal provision for the crime or infraction of active or passive "corruption," but rather deals with undue advantages at the administrative and civil levels, frauds, or acts harmful to the Public Administration—whether national or foreign—committed by legal entities (public or private) or by their agents and representatives.

Its primary objective represented a paradigm shift in Brazil: establishing the strict liability of legal entities (companies) in the administrative and civil spheres for harmful acts committed against the Public Administration, national or foreign. Until then, our system punished almost exclusively individuals (public agents and executives).

Among its main provisions (Art. 5), the law punishes conduct such as:

1. Promising or giving an undue advantage to public agents (classic "bribery");

2. Defrauding or frustrating public tenders and contracts;

3. Financing illicit acts or using shell companies; and

4. Crucial to our current debate: obstructing the investigation or inspection activities of bodies, entities, or public agents, including within regulatory agencies (item V).

Companies that commit such infractions are subject to severe sanctions, including multi-million real fines and the extraordinary publication of the condemnatory decision. There is also provision for the mitigation of penalties for companies that possess effective integrity mechanisms (Integrity and Compliance Programs) and cooperate via leniency agreements.

The Concrete Case: The Brumadinho Disaster and the CGU Fine

To understand the scale of this clash, we must return to January 25, 2019, the date of the collapse of Dam I (B1) at the Córrego do Feijão Complex in Brumadinho (MG). The tragic event claimed more than 270 lives and caused irreversible environmental damage, highlighting critical failures in safety and oversight.

The Office of the Comptroller General (CGU) initiated an Administrative Accountability Proceeding (PAR) to investigate whether Vale S.A. had committed harmful acts provided for in Law 12.846/2013. The investigation concluded that the mining company obstructed the inspection activities of the National Mining Agency (ANM) by entering false and incomplete information into the Integrated Mining Dam Management System (SIGBM).

The main irregularities identified were:

• The issuance of a positive Declaration of Stability Condition (DCE), even though the dam’s Factor of Safety (FS) was 1.09—a level below the international standard of 1.1 recommended for the activity;

• The omission of a serious incident that occurred in June 2018 related to the installation of deep horizontal drains (DHP), which was internally classified as relevant but not communicated to the regulatory body.

Based on these findings, the CGU applied a fine of R$ 86,282,265.68 to Vale, grounded in Article 5, item V, of Federal Law No. 12.846/2013. This sanction was unanimously upheld by the Superior Court of Justice (STJ), but it now faces a definitive ruling on its validity in the Supreme Federal Court (STF).

In its court defense, Vale sought to invalidate the decision. The company argued, in short, the absence of any act of corruption in the strict sense (such as the payment of kickbacks or bribery to public agents) and, consequently, the inappropriate classification of its conduct under Article 5, V, of the LAC.

The mining company's thesis is based on the idea that the Anti-Corruption Law has a narrow purpose and that the facts described in the proceeding actually pertain to regulatory obligations. For the company, these eventual failures are already subject to the specific sanctioning regime of the National Mining Agency (ANM) and environmental crime laws. Thus, applying the anti-corruption law to purely administrative or regulatory infractions would constitute a violation of the principles of legality and specificity (tipicidade), in addition to an alleged abuse of power by expanding an exceptional regime of strict liability.

It is precisely this fundamental divergence regarding the scope of Law 12.846/2013 that brought the debate to the STJ and now the STF. Currently, we are seeing a true clash of interpretations between the STJ and the STF, the outcome of which—depending on the Supreme Court's ruling—could have profound impacts on the regulation of environmental integrity and corporate governance in the country.

The Restrictive View in the STF: The LAC Limited to "Classic Bribery"

In the Supreme Federal Court (STF), Justices Nunes Marques (the case rapporteur) and Dias Toffoli voted to annul the fine, adopting a strictly restrictive and literal interpretation of what constitutes "corruption" for the purposes of applying Law 12.846/2013.

In his detailed vote, Justice Nunes Marques argues that the LAC was created with a specific historical and teleological purpose: to combat "corporate corruption" in its bribery dimension, born to fulfill international treaties on combating transnational corruption.

For this school of thought, applying the Anti-Corruption Law to infractions of a regulatory or environmental nature—in which the CGU commission itself acknowledged there was no figure of bribery or corruption in the strict sense—would constitute an abuse of power, an offense against the principle of specificity, and a violation of strict legality. Furthermore, they argue it would represent double jeopardy (bis in idem), as the State already possesses its own microsystem to punish purely environmental and administrative irregularities.

The Justice pointed out that item V of Art. 5 of the LAC (which punishes the act of obstructing inspection) cannot be read as an open-ended rule, but rather applied only when the obstruction serves to cover up corrupt schemes.

The Expansive View in the STJ: Broad Protection of Public Administration

In stark opposition to this reading, the 1st Section of the Superior Court of Justice (STJ)—the panel comprising the Court’s Public Law justices—decided unanimously to deny the writ of mandamus filed by Vale and uphold the CGU fine. The STJ decoupled the scope of the regulation from its popular name (Anti-Corruption Law).

The Court adopted the premise that Federal Law No. 12.846/2013 aims to protect the Public Administration against any act harmful to public assets or its governing principles, not being limited to bribery. Article 5, item V, of the Law is categorical in defining the act of obstructing investigation or inspection activities of bodies as an infraction.

The facts carried significant weight in this interpretation: it was found that the company, even aware that the dam's Factor of Safety (FS) was 1.09—an unacceptable level according to recommended international standards—issued a positive Declaration of Stability Condition (DCE). Furthermore, the company allegedly withheld from authorities a serious incident from June 2018 involving the installation of deep horizontal drains (DHP), which was internally classified as critical.

As aptly noted by Justice Regina Helena Costa of the STJ during the debate, relations between the State and companies must be guided by a culture of integrity; it is the duty of companies to provide complete information to authorities to enable effective oversight. Providing false and misleading data renders the exercise of preventive administrative police power impossible. For the STJ, the finding that the company obstructed the ANM’s oversight already met the criteria of the offense provided for in item V of Art. 5 of the law.

Socio-environmental Integrity as an Unescapable Pillar

Analyzing the technical arguments and the historical moment we live in, the STJ's interpretation appears to be on more solid ground, although the final judgment by the STF is still pending. Reducing the Anti-Corruption Law merely to the payment of bribes is a vision that ignores the evolution of Compliance and the urgency of the ESG agenda in the regulatory environment.

The restrictive view, as pointed out in legal analyses, generates a real incentive for postures marred by bad faith and manipulation of the control system. This crystallizes a "profit at all costs" culture, showing contempt for technical and social safety and the rigor of regulation—both in terms of command-and-control and incentives—regarding the management of environmental and social impacts and risks.

According to Transparency International - Brazil, the concept of Socio-environmental Integrity highlights the inseparable link between general corruption (including procedural fraud and data manipulation) and major environmental disasters. For the organization, concealing information and circumventing regulatory bodies not only enables severe rights violations but directly threatens the country's ability to achieve sustainable development.

In the same vein, the CGU itself, in its recent guide "Integrity Program: Guidelines for Private Companies" (August 2024), expanded the concept of corporate integrity, expressly embracing ESG (Environmental, Social, and Governance) practices. The CGU asserts that integrity is no longer just about preventing classic corruption but encompasses the prevention of ethical deviations, harassment, disrespect for human rights, and aggression toward the environment.

Furthermore, the Office of the Attorney General of the Union (AGU) has already established the understanding that serious environmental infractions can characterize improper conduct sufficient to ban a company from public tenders under the lens of the New Bidding Law (Federal Law No. 14.133/2021).

This rigor in protecting public trust and documentary truth was recently crystallized by the CGU itself in Ordinance No. 3.032 of September 2025. Through Statement No. 7, the body established that the simple presentation of a false or adulterated document to the Public Power (in the case of the statement, in tenders) already characterizes a formal administrative illicit act under the Anti-Corruption Law. The logic is exactly the same for the Vale case: falsifying or manipulating environmental stability reports (DCE) delivered to a regulatory agency is a formal fraud against the State, which mortally wounds the integrity of the oversight process.

One cannot forget another action in terms of the administrative sanctioning process related to the same Brumadinho disaster case, but currently before the

Securities and Exchange Commission of Brazil (CVM). In this case, a former executive director of Vale was also condemned for failing in his "duty of care" regarding socio-environmental risk and impact, in light of Article 153 of Law No. 6.404/1964 (the "Brazillian Corporations Law"). This case is also awaiting a final judgment.

Separating the "E" (Environmental) from the "G" (Governance) could be a strategic error for the national regulatory environment. The manipulation of technical reports and the eventual omission of critical risks to regulatory bodies constitute a grave form of integrity breach. The company's posture in the Brumadinho case—if it effectively rendered the ANM unable to adopt preventive measures that could have avoided the socio-environmental tragedy—cannot be interpreted as anything other than a breach of corporate environmental integrity.

In short, Law 12.846/2013 cannot be hollowed out to act only as a punisher of illicit financial transactions. It must serve as the State's primary safeguard against corporations that corrupt technical truth and sabotage socio-environmental protection. The Brumadinho disaster is painful proof that regulatory circumvention can cost lives and generate structural damage. Now we await the Supreme Federal Court, which may (or may not) align its jurisprudence with this systemic view, reaffirming that there is no real compliance without an non-negotiable commitment to socio-environmental integrity.

Next Steps in the STF...

The case, currently being judged by the Second Panel of the STF, saw votes from Nunes Marques (rapporteur) and Dias Toffoli in favor of Vale, under the argument that the Anti-Corruption Law should not be a "general code" for administrative failures. In February 2026, Gilmar Mendes requested a stay for review (pedido de vista), suspending the analysis. The outcome, which will redefine compliance in Brazil, awaits the return of the case by Mendes and the votes of André Mendonça and Luiz Fux.

And you, which side of this debate are you on? Do you believe the "Anti-Corruption" Law should encompass documentary fraud in projects with major impacts and risks, such as environmental authorizations and licensing, or do you agree with the restrictive view?

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Originally published on LinkedIn.

Author: Bruno Teixeira Peixoto